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Abstract. Models of deliberative dialogue are fundamental for developing autonomous systems that support human practical
reasoning. The question discussed in this paper is whether existing models are able to capture the complexity and richness of
natural deliberation. In real-world contexts, circumstances relevant to the decision can change rapidly. We reflect on today’s
leading model of deliberation dialogue and we propose an extension to capture how newly exchanged information about chang-
ing circumstances may shape the dialogue. Moreover, in natural deliberation, a dialogue may be successful even if a decision on
what to do has not been made. A set of criteria is proposed to address the problem of when to close off the practical reasoning
phase of dialogue. We discuss some measures for evaluating the success of a dialogue after closure and we present some initial
efforts to introduce the new deliberation features within an existing model of agent dialogue. We believe that our extended
model of dialogue may contribute to representing that richness of natural deliberative dialogue that is yet to be addressed in
existing models of agent deliberation.
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1. Introduction
Practical reasoning is the inferential process of arriving at a conclusion to take action. Deliberative
dialogue serves as a rational method of decision on what to do, thus rational deliberation cannot be
understood without the fabric of practical reasoning that holds it together. Deliberation is often taken to
be a solitary process in which an individual arrives at an intelligent conclusion on how to act by forming
a goal and collecting data. Even individual deliberation can be seen as a process in which one “thinks
aloud” by asking questions and then answers them himself. By answering such questions in a dialogue
format, one can clarify his goals in light of his present situation and its potential future consequences.
Practical reasoning in this context is seen as a form of argumentation. Group deliberations are also
common: typically an individual is not acting in isolation, and the goal of participants is to decide what
to do in collaboration.
Practical reasoning is foundational to current research initiatives in computing, especially in multi-
agent systems; e.g., support to electronic democracy [6], and reasoning about patients’ medical treat-
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ments [3,5]. The capability of the user, or of the agents within the system, to pose critical questions and
reply to counter-arguments for a proposed plan of action is vital for this application, as such deliberations
are only useful if weak points in a proposal can be questioned. Often there is a gap between agent-based
and human reasoning, however. Formal models of argumentation-based dialogue exploit natural ways for
humans to represent justifications and conflicts in making decisions [3,7], but these models often detach
from natural argumentation to focus on logical formalisms. In so doing, these models make simplifying
assumptions such as common knowledge among participants in a dialogue. In general, it is important
to consider situations in which participants’ goals differ, although they have identified the need to coor-
dinate activities. Even if we assume that there is a common goal, common knowledge is a very strong
assumption. Models such as those proposed by Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2], Black and Atkinson [3]
and Kok et al. [7] rely on there being a common understanding of the problem at hand, with the debate
being focussed on which solution is best given the preferences of all parties engaged. Even if partic-
ipants wish to share knowledge prior to dialogue, in any non-trivial situation they do not necessarily
know what is relevant to the problem at hand. Sharing all knowledge is infeasible, and in some domains
local policies may constrain information sharing; e.g. between a non-governmental aid organization and
a military coalition [10]. The need to share information during deliberation is, therefore, essential for
the richness of real-world dialogues to be modeled. There is also a lack of rigorous evaluation of the
effectiveness of these models of dialogue. Research typically proves some formal properties, and then
illustrates its applications through the use of examples (cf. [12]). In order for argumentation models to
be deployed in real-world practical applications where humans and autonomous agents collaborate in
making decisions, these systems must resemble natural argumentation and their benefits must be eval-
uated. While formal systems are developed from models of human deliberation, there is little effort in
the literature to understand whether these systems are useful, and to verify to what extent the richness of
human practical reasoning can be represented by them. This paper is within the context of the broader
question: are existing models of autonomous deliberative dialogue able to capture the complexity and
richness of realistic natural deliberation?
We discuss the leading model of deliberation dialogue in Artificial Intelligence [8]. This is the right
type of framework to represent how practical reasoning is used in realistic cases, but at least two impor-
tant phases should be investigated further. In real world scenarios, circumstances relevant to the decision
can change rapidly. Participants may also share individual knowledge during dialogue that changes the
circumstances. It is vitally important for the agent who is to deliberate intelligently to be aware of these
changes, thus we propose an extension to the argumentation phase of the dialogue that takes changes in
circumstances into account during the course of the deliberation itself. Moreover, in many instances, a
deliberative dialogue can be very successful educationally in revealing the arguments and positions on
both sides, even though the dialogue did not succeed in determining what to do. This raises the problem
of when practical reasoning should be closed off and how to establish the success of a dialogue. We
propose a solution to this closure problem by presenting ten criteria that determine when a deliberation
has been successful in realistic cases.
In this paper, we show that these two phases of natural dialogue are to a certain extent addressed in the
argumentation-based deliberation system presented in [12]. In order to do so, we analyze the empirical
evaluation presented in our previous work in the light of the new considerations presented in this paper.
We show that this model is able to capture the information sharing that changes circumstances during
the dialogue and that this is fundamental for obtaining more successful outcomes in a situation where
new information is continually streaming in. We also show that some of our measures may prove useful
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for the evaluation of at least two criteria proposed for successful dialogue. We argue that this dialogue
system is a first attempt to fill some of the gaps that exist in autonomous deliberation models identified
in this research.
2. The McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons model
In this section we briefly present the leading model of deliberation dialogue by McBurney, Hitchcock
and Parsons [8]. For convenience, hereafter we refer to this model as the MHP model.
Deliberation in an MHP dialogue is seen as a resource-bounded procedure that starts from an initial
situation where a choice has to be made, moving towards a closing stage where the decision is arrived
at on the basis of pro and con arguments that have been put forward in a middle stage [15]. According
to the MHP dialogue model, deliberation is a formal procedure that goes through eight stages. The
dialogue has an opening stage where the question is raised about what is to be done, and a closing stage
where the sequence of deliberation is ended. This special question raised at the opening stage is called
the governing question, meaning that this single question governs the whole dialogue, including the
opening and closing stages.
1. The opening stage. The governing question is raised.
2. The inform stage. Next there is a discussion of goals, any constraints on the actions being consid-
ered, and any external facts relevant to the dialogue.
3. The propose stage. At this stage proposals for possible action are brought forward.
4. The consider stage. Comments are made on the proposals that have been brought forward. At this
stage, arguments for and against proposals are considered.
5. The revise stage. At this stage, the goals, the actions that have been proposed, and the facts that have
been collected and that are relevant to the deliberation may be revised. Another type of dialogue,
for example a persuasion dialogue, may be embedded in the deliberation dialogue.
6. The recommend stage. Participants can recommend a particular action and the other participants
can either accept or reject this option.
7. The confirm stage. All participants must confirm their acceptance of one particular option for action
in order for the dialogue to terminate.
8. The close stage. At this point the dialogue terminates.
In the MHP dialogue, a formal protocol describes what moves can be made by each party at which stages
of the dialogue. They define the speech act of propose, propose(), as a valid instance of the type of speech
act containing a goal, a fact and an action, including some other elements called constraint, evaluation,
and perspective. They also have speech acts for making an assertion, assert(), preferring a particular
option for action, prefer(), asking the other party to justify an assertion, ask_justify(), requesting a deci-
sion about an action, move(action), pronouncing on whether a proposal for action should be accepted or
rejected, assert(action) and reject(), retracting a previous location, retract(), and withdrawing from the
deliberation dialogue withdraw().
The structure of the MHP dialogue is shown in Fig. 1. In the opening stage the goal of the dialogue
is defined. The goal is for the participants to decide what is the best decision. Once the opening stage is
set in place, the dialogue moves forward to a more complex middle stage that has several components.
For convenience sake, we call this middle stage the argumentation stage. Whether the case is one of a
single agent or group deliberation, the first step in this middle stage is to inform the agent(s) what the
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Fig. 1. Outline of the McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (MHP) model.
circumstances are. Thus, there needs to be an information-seeking dialogue embedded into a deliber-
ation dialogue. For the purposes of modeling an abstract normative model of rational deliberation, the
information-seeking part needs to be seen as a distinctive element, and because of its importance it is
placed at the beginning of the middle stage.
Once the information is in, the second part of the middle stage is putting forward proposals by all
parties to the deliberation dialogue. Then the dialogue moves to the consider stage and the revise stage.
During this stage each party probes into the proposals put forward by other parties by raising questions
about possible problems with the proposal and even by attacking the proposal with counterarguments.
In response to an attack on its proposal, the agent may concede, and retract its commitment or refine the
proposal.
3. Deliberation with open knowledge base
The MHP protocol represents many examples of realistic argumentation in deliberation dialogue.
One of the problems with this model, however, is that it does not take into account changes of the
circumstances of deliberation. In this section, we discuss how to extend the MHP model to make the
role of the knowledge base of the agents involved more explicit.
3.1. The need for an open knowledge base
Consider the following dialogue between Alice and Bob extracted from an extended example in Wal-
ton [13].
Example 1. In this dialogue, the governing question and the inform stage are motivated by the fact
that Alice and Bob would like to find a suitable house in Windsor. At the propose stage they nar-
rowed their choices down to two: a condo and a two-story house. Both Alice and Bob place a high
value on health, costs, and on the environment. A segment of the consider stage of dialogue follows:
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Bob: With the condo I can ride to work on my bike in 35 minutes. The bike path goes right along the
river straight to my office.
Alice: The problem with the two-story house is that it is twice as far away as the two other homes. It
would take over an hour for you to ride the bike in.
Bob: If we lived there, I would have to drive the car to work most days.
Alice: Riding the bike to work is more environmentally friendly. Also, you really like riding your bike
to work, and it is good exercise.
Bob: Yes, and there is also the factor of the cost of gas. The cost of driving to work adds up to a
significant amount over a year. Also, neither of us likes spending a lot of time in the car. It is
wasted time, and getting exercise is a good way to spend that time. When you spend your whole
day working on a computer, it is really important to get some exercise to break up your day.
Alice: That is offset by the lower taxes of the two story house, because it is outside the city, even though
it is a larger house.
Bob: I say let’s make an offer on the condo.
The formal dialogue sequence according to the MHP is shown in Fig. 2.
The MHP protocol formally represents the stages of the deliberation between Alice and Bob. However,
if the circumstances change, and more information is needed before making a decision, the protocol
may not be able to capture such characteristics. This is the case for example of move u11 where new
information is now relevant. Such move cannot be represented in the current formalization of the MHP
model. In fact, there is an assumption that all the participants have already gathered full knowledge of
the circumstances either prior to the dialogue or during the information-seeking stage. New knowledge
can only be added to the commitment store using speech acts assert(fact), exclusively during the inform
stage. During the revise stage, revisions to facts may be possible via a propose(fact) speech act, which
does not change the commitment store, however. This ensures that no other information during the
propose and consider phases will change the view of the circumstances.
Goal: Buy a house in Windsor
u1 : assert(Bob, evaluation, “With condo can ride to work in 35 m”)
u2 : assert(Alice, evaluation, “The two-story house requires 1 h to ride to work”)
u3 : assert(Bob, evaluation, “With the two-story house I have to drive a car”)
u4 : prefer(Alice, “Riding to work”, “Driving to work”)
u5 : assert(Alice, evaluation, “Riding to work environmentally friendly”)
u6 : assert(Alice, evaluation, “Bob likes riding bikes”)
u7 : prefer(Bob, “Riding to work”, “Driving to work”)
u8 : assert(Bob, evaluation, “Significant cost saving using gas”)
u9 : assert(Bob, evaluation, “Time spent in the car is wasted”)
u10 : prefer(Bob, “Spending time doing exercise”, “Spending time in the car”)
u11 : “Bob states that he works at the computer all day”
u12 : assert(Bob, evaluation, “Exercise breaks up Bob’s day”)
u13 : assert(Alice, evaluation, “The two-story house is larger”)
u14 : assert(Alice, evaluation, “The two-story house has less tax”)
u15 : prefer(Alice, “Buy the condo”, “Buy the two-story house”)
u16 : move(Bob, action, “Buy the condo”) . . .
Fig. 2. Formalization of the speech acts in Example 1.
160 D. Walton et al. / Towards a richer model of deliberation dialogue
The deliberation dialogue always arises out of the question of what to do in any given set of circum-
stances and the information relevant to the circumstances is vital to arriving at a rational decision. In any
real case, however, new information will need to be introduced during all sequences of argumentation
prior to the closing stage and the dialogue model must support the new changes in the knowledge base.
The following example will clarify this problem further.
Example 2. Brian had a problem with his printer. Whenever he scanned a document using the automatic
document feeder, a black line appeared down the middle of the page. To solve the problem he searches
for a troubleshooting guide for its printer. This guide gave a series of instructions. If this problem happens
when you print and copy/scan, the problem is in the print engine itself, hence refer to a certain website
for help troubleshooting. However in Brian’s case, the defect only occurred when scanning from the
automatic document feeder. Following the instruction in the troubleshooting guide, first Brian opened
the scanner cover checked for debris. There was none. Next he located the small strip of glass at the left
of the main glass area. He carefully cleaned the glass with a soft cloth, and then scanned a document to
see if this fixed the problem. It did not. Then he looked at the glass and he could see that it was covered
by a thin plastic piece. He then managed to pull the plastic piece out. He found a small black mark in
the middle on the bottom of the plastic piece. He tried cleaning the plastic, but it did not work, as he
found by scanning a test document. He then showed the plastic piece to his wife Anna, and asked her
if there was some way it might be possible to clean it to remove the small black mark. She proposed to
use a soft cleaning pad and they managed to remove the black mark. Brian went through the scanning
procedure as a test. Success! There was no longer a black line down the middle of the pages that were
scanned. Brian’s problem was solved. An interpretation of the formal dialogue is shown in Fig. 3.
One of the most important aspects of this case is that the deliberation was based on a prior process
of information-seeking dialogue. Moreover, the information-seeking dialogue was interwoven with the
steps taken during the sequence of practical reasoning in the deliberation dialogue. The MHP dialogue
permits the representation of Brian’s monologue in order to make a decision on what to do to fix the
printer, considering the search for information as the troubleshooting instructions. However, if an agent
were to act on Brian’s behalf, it would have to add a new piece of information to its knowledge base;
i.e., u6: “The scanner is not working even if the instructions were followed”. The MHP dialogue does
not allow this to be included. In order to identify the next solution, this information must be taken into
consideration since it changes the circumstances, otherwise the agent would continue to propose the
same decision; i.e., “Follow the n steps in the guide”.
The above discussion suggests that the changes in the knowledge-base during the dialogue and their
effect on choosing new proposals must be investigated further. The MHP model of deliberation dialogue
Goal: Remove black line from printer
u1 : propose(Brian, action, “Read troubleshooting guide”)
u2 : assert(Brian, fact, “From troubleshooting guide: follow n steps”)
u3 : propose(Brian, action, “Follow n steps”)
u4 : move(Brian, action, “Follow n steps”)
u5 : assert(Brian, action, “Follow n steps”)
u6 : “Brian followed the n steps but the printer does not work”
u7 : propose(Anna, action, “Clean the plastic part with detergent”)
u8 : move(Anna, action, “Clean the plastic part with detergent”) . . .
Fig. 3. Interpretation of the printer example dialogue.
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needs some revisions to bring it in line with an open knowledge-base that takes into account the change
of circumstances during the argumentation stage.
3.2. An extended dialogue model for open knowledge
One of the most important factors in intelligent deliberation is that in real scenarios the circumstances
of the world can change, and it is vitally important for the agent who is to deliberate intelligently to
be aware of these changes and to take them into account during the course of the deliberation itself.
Intelligent deliberation needs to be both informed and flexible. Some of the agents may know things that
the others do not know, or information may only become relevant during the course of the dialogue. It
is important that the knowledge base is left open during the argumentation stage so that new, relevant
information that might affect proposals and commitments can come in. The MHP model has led to
the development of a number of deliberation protocols employed in multiagent systems where agents
have complete shared knowledge of the circumstances [3,7,9]. Optional actions in these frameworks are
assigned to the agents for discussion at the initial stage of dialogue and information shared during the
dialogue is not taken into account when selecting new proposals to be discussed. An error in a rational
deliberation, however, is for the agent to become inflexible by failing to take new relevant developments
into account when deciding what to do.
For this reason, deliberation as a framework for rational argumentation needs to be extended from the
structure described above. Instead of the knowledge base being fixed at the opening stage, propositions
need to be added to it and deleted from it as the deliberation proceeds through the argumentation stage.
In Fig. 4, we propose a revised model, where we highlight the role of an open knowledge base.
A knowledge base is set in place at the opening stage and agreed to by all parties in the delibera-
tion as representing the circumstances of the situation in which the governing question is framed. This
knowledge base is fixed in place at the opening stage and is part of what defines the choice that is to
be made as stated by the governing question of the deliberation. The knowledge base can be updated
during an information-seeking dialogue. More importantly, once we reach the argumentation stage, this
knowledge base needs to be open so that if the situation changes, and information about these changes
Fig. 4. Outline of a revised model of deliberation dialogue.
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becomes available to the agents, this knowledge is taken into account during the stage where proposals
are put forward, considered and evaluated.
The proposals may need to be modified or evaluated differently once this new information comes to
be known. During this stage, some agents will have knowledge that others lack, and thus one important
type of speech act is that of asserting a proposition that represents factual knowledge to inform the other
agents involved in the deliberation process. There is the need to introduce a new speech act here that
allows the assertion of the new knowledge and the revision of the commitment store. Here we refer to
this speech act that is meant to intentionally exchange new information with disclose(fact). This fact
may be a new piece of information that was not known at previous stages of the dialogue. Thus, during
the argumentation stage, new information that comes in may alter the structure of the choice being made,
by dynamically revising each participant’s knowledge of the world, which may lead to suggest a new
option.
In this section, we discussed the need for the MHP model to be revised, especially in relation to the
cases where the agents taking part in the deliberation have partial views of the circumstances of the
world. The revised version offered here provides for the sharing of information between agents while
deliberating so that better proposal can be identified. In the next section, we discuss a further problem of
the MHP dialogue that may arise when agents have open knowledge: when a dialogue is to be considered
successful.
4. Determining a successful deliberation
In the new model, there is a cycle of proposing, considering and revising as new information comes
in, and evaluating the proposals in light of this new information. There is a danger that this cyclical
process can continue infinitely, stalling the deliberation. Hence, it is necessary to have a closing stage so
that the argumentation stage can be terminated once it has been judged that enough information on the
circumstances of the decision has been taken into account. But when can the search for knowledge about
a case be closed off so that the premises of the practical reasoning provide an evidential base sufficient
to prove the conclusion? In this section, we discuss the closure problem as the problem of determining
when practical reasoning ends.
4.1. The closure problem
Here we attempt to define conditions for closure of practical reasoning. A deliberation may have to be
closed off and a decision taken based on the pro and con arguments put forward for practical reasons,
typically time and money. A decision by majority vote may have to be taken to meet the practical
demand for closing of the discussion. However, the depth, comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the
pro and con arguments brought for and against the proposals is the most valuable feature of a deliberation
leading to a supported conclusion offering a well-reasoned decision for action. There are also some
issues remaining about how to represent the closing stage. What if it cannot be determined, on the
evidence, which is the best proposal?
In a case of deliberation, like that between Alice and Bob, the dialogue can be closed when they have
collected enough information about what is available on the real estate market, and they have discussed
the matter thoroughly enough to critically examine all the pro and con arguments on both sides of every
available option. At that point, even though the deliberation could be reopened before they make an
offer and are committed to it, the dialogue has reached the closing point. If one party has put forward
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a particular proposal, and nobody else has any objections, then, at least temporarily, the deliberation
is closed. They have found a proposed course of action that they all agree on, or at least that nobody
disagrees with, or is willing to contend further. Hence the deliberation is over. A reasoned decision can
now be arrived at on what to do. There are different options. The original proposal can be accepted or
the original proposal can be rejected, in which cases the deliberation stops. The proposal can simply
be modified, to consider the objections made during the dialogue, or a counterproposal can be brought
forward. In the latter two cases, the procedure of formulating a proposal goes around the cycle again,
except that this time a new proposal has been formulated in place of the one that was not accepted.
The decision of when the deliberation has reached its closing stage cannot be made by any current
model of deliberation. In an emergency, the closing stage may have to be reached quickly. In theory, the
closing stage should only be reached when the arguments and proposals considered on all sides have been
sufficiently discussed so that all the relevant factors have been considered. In practice, a decision in the
circumstances may have to be made within time constraints, and so a determination of which proposal is
best may still be subject to pro and contra argumentation. In such cases, the argumentation stage should
be closed off and some means taken to arrive at a decision, such as taking a vote. It is also possible,
however, that in real instances of deliberation, there may be no agreement on the best proposal for action
to solve the problem posed by the governing question. In this case, in the MHP model, presumably
the deliberation dialogue must be considered a failure, because the governing question has not been
answered. Nevertheless, the deliberation could have educational value, in that the consideration of the
pro and con arguments might have shown deficiencies in some of the proposals. This revelation might
have deepened the understanding of the participants.
Note that the only stages which must occur in every dialogue that terminates normally are the opening
and the closing stage. It appears that we must have the closing stage in every deliberation dialogue, or
at least in every successful deliberation dialogue. Hence, in the MHP model, a dialogue cannot really be
a deliberation dialogue unless it terminates in a closing stage where a decision is arrived at on the best
course of action to take. This remark is a revealing comment on the general problem of formulating goals
in formal systems of dialogue. It also affects the persuasion type of dialogue. The goal of a persuasion
dialogue is to resolve the conflict of opinions agreed upon as the issue at the opening stage. However, in
many instances, a persuasion dialogue can be very successful educationally in revealing the arguments
and positions on both sides. Determining the criteria of success of a dialogue in meeting its goal is a
general problem for formal dialogue systems.
4.2. Criteria for closure of deliberative dialogue
In order to address the closure problem of a dialogue, here we define ten criteria that determine the
extent to which a deliberation has been successful:
(1) Whether the proposals that were discussed represent all the proposals that should be considered, or
whether some proposals that should have been discussed were not.
(2) The accuracy and completeness of the information regarding the circumstances of the case made
available to the agents during the opening stage.
(3) How well arguments were critically questioned or attacked by counterarguments.
(4) How well the agents followed the procedural rules by allowing the other agents to present their
proposals and arguments openly, and how they responded to proposals.
(5) How thoroughly each of the proposals that were put forward during the deliberation were engaged
by supporting or attacking arguments.
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(6) Whether any arguments that should have been considered were not given due consideration.
(7) How good the arguments were that support or attack each of the proposals, depending on the
validity of the arguments and the factual accuracy of their premises.
(8) Whether the argumentation avoided personal attacks, or was unduly influenced by opinion leaders
or personalities who dominated discussion during the argumentation stage.
(9) The relevance of the arguments put forward during the argumentation stage.
(10) The taking into account of the values of the group of agents engaged in the deliberation.
The relevance of an argument is determined by how it fits into a sequence of argumentation that
connects to the problem or choice of action set as the issue of the deliberation at the opening stage.
To declare that the closing stage has been reached, the participants in the deliberation must reach a
consensus on whether the deliberation has been successful, based on the ten criteria above, so that one
proposal has been shown to be superior to the others. This is called an internal evaluation of the success
of the dialogue. The other way is an external evaluation carried out at a metalevel. Once a deliberation
has been carried out in a given case by a group of agents, another group of agents can then keep a record
of the argumentation in the deliberation, for example by keeping a transcript of the discussions. Then
they can analyze and evaluate the argumentation in the deliberation dialogue, and arrive at an evaluation
of how successful the dialogue was according to the ten criteria set out above.
This solution to the closure problem, while not yet implemented in a computational system, is useful
for the project of improving current models of deliberation. The closure problem in other dialogues
is different than using the closure conditions for deliberation dialogue proposed here. To explain this
difference consider the inquiry dialogue. The inquiry is closed only when it can be shown that the
proposition at issue can be proved, or where it can be definitively shown that it cannot be proved even
though a large body of relevant evidence has been collected. The goal of the inquiry dialogue is to
prove a proposition is true by a sequence of argumentation that is strong enough to meet the standard
of proof appropriate for the type of inquiry. Argumentation in the inquiry is characterized by the goal
of establishing a cumulative process of argument that builds only on established facts in order to prove
a conclusion to a high standard of proof. Burden of proof in an inquiry is characteristically set at high
standard ([15], p. 73). In contrast, there is no burden of proof in a deliberation dialogue, only a burden of
reasonable explanation [14]. This situation is then different from that of the deliberation dialogue where
the purpose of the dialogue is to make a decision on what to do or solve a practical problem. In this case,
it may be necessary to take action, or decide not to take action based on a lower standard to show that an
action can be justified or not such as the standard of the preponderance of the evidence. One reason for
this difference is the propensity of the circumstances to change, hence the need for a different definition
of the closure problem as the one we proposed in this section.
5. Effects of open knowledge-base in agent applications
In the previous sections, we discussed the motivation for the need of an extended model of deliberation
to capture the changes of circumstances during dialogue as well as define criteria for determining the
success of a dialogue. In this section, we analyze a model of deliberation presented in our previous re-
search [11,12] with the purpose of showing an initial approach to this extended model and its importance.
This model is designed for agents with individual plans to achieve different individual objectives, where
agents discuss interdependencies and may highlight arising conflicts caused by mutually-exclusive goals,
scheduling constraints and norms. Hence, agents gather information about circumstances, not only at the
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initial stage of the dialogue but during its course. We intend to show, by means of an empirical evalu-
ation, that this is necessary for agents to identify an agreement in situations where agents do not have
shared knowledge about each other’s plans.
In the example of the deliberation used in Toniolo et al. [12], agents are discussing the repair of the
water supply in a particular location where a disaster has occurred. One agent proposes to stop the water
supply in the location while the other argues about the need for water to perform activities that include
the building of a field hospital to deal with casualties. The first agent, however, has a goal of stopping
the water supply that is contaminated. Water that is contaminated is not safe, and that constitutes an
argument against allowing the use of the water supply in that location. The two agents then discuss other
options, for example building the field hospital first but not using the water supply until after it can
be guaranteed that the water is safe. They discuss other options as well, for example building the field
hospital in a different location. By communicating the circumstances to each other, and by constructing
arguments to respond to arguments put forward by the other side, for example the argument that building
water supply at this location would not be safe, the dialogue can proceed in an orderly way.
The protocol used in Toniolo et al. [12] considers two agents, each with individual goals and norms
a different view of the world, that form interdependent plans to achieve their goals. This represents the
case of separate individual knowledge bases. An agent proposes an action, that we refer to as Adk, for
discussion that may affect the other agent’s plan. There are a number of actions Adl to be discussed
in each agent’s plan. The dialogue proceeds in a turn-taking fashion following a re-elaboration of the
dialogue protocol of Kok et al. [7]. This protocol comprises the deliberation stages and the speech acts
of the MHP model. After the opening stage, agents exchange pro or con arguments for the adoption of
the action proposed Adk. When an agent fails to defend its claims, it must pass and the dialogue pauses.
Agents may replan considering new information acquired during the dialogue. If the issue has not been
solved, and an agent finds a suitable alternative, a subsequent argumentation phase is initiated to debate
the new proposal. The dialogue terminates when an agreement is found or no other alternatives exist. In
the latter case, if the proponent failed to defend Adk, the action and the goal that action would contribute
to achieve are dropped. If the opponent failed, it is forced to rearrange its plan to include Adk dropping
some of its goals if necessary. If there are other actions Adl to be discussed a new dialogue will be
opened. When the agents have no further issues, they will inform each other that they are satisfied and
the process ends. The deliberation process is summarized in Fig. 5.
The important characteristic of this dialogue structure is that it allows the agents to construct alterna-
tives dynamically as they acquire information during the sequence of dialogue. This exchange of infor-
mation enables them to reduce the number of conflicts in their interdependent plans related to scheduling
or norm violations. When such conflicts arise, they can be dealt with by two means: (1) argument ex-
changes, describing negative consequences, and (2) by exchanging information about the circumstances
of the case as new circumstances come to be known by one party. The former type of argument de-
scribes what conflicts may not permit an action to be performed, or a state of the world to be achieved.
We refer to this type of arguments as Argdef, a defeat for an argument that contradicts the premises or the
conclusions of another argument. In the latter, information about new circumstances can be exchanged
by offering support to previously stated claims. These statements explain part of the plans or new obli-
gations. This information asserted by an agent represents a change of the circumstances known by the
other agent because it was not part of their common knowledge. In fact, new obligations may become
active or new actions may become possible only given the new knowledge about a state of the world that
was shared during the dialogue. We refer to these statements as defeasible supporting arguments Argsup,
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Fig. 5. Overview of agent deliberation process.
since circumstances of the agents’ plans may change or the knowledge of an agent may contradict that
of others.
In our dialogue protocol, we consider two ways to exchange supporting statements. An agent may
ask “why?”, (e.g., “Why do you want to perform this action?”) and the other agent counter-argues this
by explaining some circumstances, argue(Argsup). More importantly, an agent may take the initiative
to exchange new information about circumstances at any point of the dialogue. Following the model
previously described in Section 3.2, we identify the intentional act of exchanging this information with
disclose(Argsup). Agents are able to modify their plans dynamically and add new pieces of information
into their knowledge-base throughout the dialogue. It is fundamental for agents to share the information
about their circumstances with other agents, in order to establish a more favorable agreement; i.e., iden-
tify adequate alternatives to solve conflicts within interdependent plans. We argue that by introducing the
disclose(Argsup) act in our dialogue protocol we are able to represent the type of extension proposed in
this paper that permits agents to consider changes of circumstances during the course of the deliberation.
The integration of new information within a fully autonomous deliberation system may be problem-
atic, however, and one way to address this is to deal with this information within the underpinning
system used to identify actions or plans. For example, an open world may lead to no solutions for the
frame problem in a planning domain; i.e., that of representing effects of an action without explicitly
representing all the invariants of the domain. In our framework, we address this via the underpinning
planning system using external knowledge-producing actions that can be added to the current chosen
plan allowing an agent to access and incorporate new knowledge (more details are discussed in [11]).
However, we believe that the disclosure of information about changes of circumstances or action expla-
nations should be represented at the protocol level in order to capture the effects of the new information
on the process of identifying new proposals. This is especially important in situations where agents do
not have common objectives such as in the disaster response example. To develop richer and more flex-
ible deliberative supporting systems, we must model that participants propose new alternatives within
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the same dialogue guided by the information shared during dialogue, instead of selecting them from a
fixed set established at the opening stage.
6. Evaluating the effects of an open knowledge base
In our previous work [11,12], we performed an empirical evaluation of a system employing our model
of deliberation. Here we report some results and further considerations to support our claim that taking
into consideration new information shared during the dialogue to identify alternatives is necessary for
agents to find better alternatives for interdependent plans.
In order to show the difference introduced by disclose(Argsup) we consider two protocols, Pcir and
Pncir, to be used by agents in the argumentation phase. The agents follow the process depicted in Fig. 5.
Agents may only perform disclose(Argsup) within protocol Pcir, which represents a more flexible proto-
col, while with the use of Pncir agents are constrained to argue only against some negative consequences
in adopting a new action. In [11] those are respectively Psym and Pasym, where the only difference is
that disclose(Argsup) was previously represented with a speech act argue(Argsup). The protocols are pre-
sented in Table 1 where each speech act in the right and middle columns may respond to one act in the
left column previously performed by the other agent.
6.1. Experiment settings
The empirical evaluation that we performed aimed at showing that usingPcir agents are able to identify
better solutions to interdependent conflicts. This would provide evidence for the fact that it is necessary
for agents to adopt a model of open knowledge base. Experiments were run by generating plans within
the disaster response domain, where one agent represents a humanitarian organization and the other
represents a local authority. We generated 275 pairs of individual plans, where each plan had an average
of 5 individual different objectives and 50 actions. The pair of plans varied in number of initial conflicts
related to scheduling or norm violations forming a total of 11 conflict configurations in a range from
Table 1
Speech acts of each protocol P
Speech act Attacks Surrenders
propose(Adk) –[Pncir,Pcir]reject(Adk) accept(Adk)
–[Pncir,Pcir]why(Adk)




argue(Argdefi ) –[Pncir,Pcir]why() and  ∈ Argdefi withdraw(Adk) or accept(Adk)
–[Pncir,Pcir]argue(Argdefj ) and Argdefj defeats Argdefi
–[Pcir]disclose(Argsup) and Argsup explains  ∈ Argdefi
why() –[Pncir,Pcir]argue(Argsup) and Argsup explains  withdraw(Adk) or accept(Adk)
disclose(Argsup)[Pcir] –[Pcir]argue(Argdef) and Argdef defeats Argsup withdraw(Adk) or accept(Adk)
–[Pcir]why() and  ∈ Argsup
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u1 : propose(x, “stop the water supply in LocA”)
u2 : reject(y, “stop the water supply in LocA”)
u3 : disclose(x, “obliged to stop the water supply because it is contaminated”)
u4 : argue(y, “need the water supply in LocA to build a field hospital”)
u5 : why(x, “build a field hospital in LocA”)
u6 : argue(y, “need the field hospital to run it in LocA”)
u7 : argue(x, “forbidden to run the field hospital because there are excavators operating in LocA”)
u8 : accept(y, “stop the water supply in LocA”) . . .
y replans and decides to build the field hospital in LocB. This solution leads to two normative conflicts
resolved and two plan constraints resolved.
Fig. 6. The disaster response example dialogue.
25 to 75 conflicts (i.e., 25, 30, . . . , 70, 75). Collaboration between agents was enforced for 5%–10% of
the total number of actions in each plan, and these represent the dependencies that required discussion
between agents.
In an experimental run with two agents, each agent was assigned an individual plan and a number of
dependent actions Adl that would need to be discussed with the other agent following either Pcir or Pncir.
An experimental run would only terminate when all the dependencies of both agents were discussed
resulting in many dialogues during one run. At the end of each dialogue agents replanned using the
information shared during dialogue if it was required. In Fig. 6 we propose a simplified formalization of
a dialogue between two agents x and y within the disaster response domain as presented in the previous
section.
The plans for each experimental run were analyzed to measure the conflicts before the dialogue,
referred to as TOT and after the dialogue. We recorded the number of conflicts that agents were able to
solve SOLV , the number of conflicts removed by dropping goals when an agreement could not be found
DROP, and the total number of arguments used ARGS.
6.2. Better plans with information disclosure: Experiment results
A summary of the experiment results is proposed in Table 2. Here we report only those relevant to
our discussion, more details can be found in [12]. The results showed that the percentage of conflicts
resolved (SOLV/TOT) on average is significantly higher by about 18% in protocol Pcir than in protocol
Pncir. This shows that by volunteering further information during the dialogue agents are able to solve
more conflicts among existing plan, norm and goal commitments. Furthermore, we showed that the
percentage of conflicts removed (DROP/TOT) due to goals being dropped is significantly higher by
about 19% in Pncir than in protocol Pcir. Agents remove a very similar number of conflicts with the two
protocols, but with Pcir those are resolved while with Pncir agents discard more goals because they are
not able to find a suitable solution. Finally, regarding the number of arguments exchanged ARGS, we
showed that the use of Pcir is more effective in conveying information about conflicts between plans due
to the use of more supporting arguments. There is a significant difference between medians of about
28%, showing that more information about plan requirements was exchanged.1
1Results were statistically significant with p  0.001, where significance tests were performed with the Mann–Whitney U
test.




Median %SOLV/TOT 30 48
Median %DROP/TOT 43 24
Median ARGS 11 39
In conclusion, the dialogue is more likely to be successful with a protocol where agents are able to
intentionally exchange information about circumstances. This is because at any point in dialogue, an
agent may disclose some information about the reason for adopting a particular action, due to causal
constraints or norm requirements. These explanations, in the form of new information, permit agents
to find more favorable alternatives to fulfill the dependency, in case of conflicts. The results prove that
by permitting agents to disclose information about individual circumstances we obtain a significant
improvement on the number of agreements established.
These results show that the introduction of a flexible knowledge-base where agents can add pieces
of information about circumstances while deliberating is fundamental for establishing more successful
agreements. In the next section, we report in more detail some results obtained in the investigation of
our second objectives: whether a dialogue has been successful.
7. Measures for criteria of closure
In Section 4.2 we formulated ten criteria for assessing whether a deliberative dialogue has been suc-
cessful. In this section, we discuss some measures for external evaluation of success carried out by
looking at the record of deliberation. In order to do so, we now report two measures used in [12] that
may be useful to evaluate the success of a deliberation dialogue.
7.1. Criteria and hypotheses
The criteria proposed are necessary in human deliberation to determine whether enough proposals
have been discussed and they are particularly useful to determine the educational value of deliberation
in situations when an open knowledge base is introduced. However, existing systems for evaluation (e.g.,
[4]) use dialogue protocols based on the MHP model, thus their methods for evaluation are limited to
assessing whether the agreement was found or not. We argue that if agents were to follow a more natural
deliberation dialogue our criteria are necessary to assess the educational benefits of protocols for agent
deliberation. While the criteria function as guidelines for evaluation, we must define specific measures
to compute these benefits. We propose a measure for evaluating the following criteria within the system
presented in Section 4:
(2) The accuracy and completeness of the information regarding the circumstances of the case; and
(5) How thoroughly each of the proposals that were put forward during the deliberation were engaged
by supporting or attacking arguments.
In our system, we want to assess the educational role of the argumentation phase in terms of how well
agents are able to align their knowledge about the circumstances. The goal of our experiments is to show
that finding an agreement is important, but more important is being able to resolve as many conflicts be-
tween interdependent plans as possible through dialogue. This is only possible by using the information
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that is shared to dynamically plan alternative solutions that are more adequate to resolve the conflicts
discovered. This also establishes how beneficial or successful the deliberative dialogue has been. We
define a beneficial outcome as:
Definition 1. A feasible plan is one that an agent is able to enact without impeding another’s goals.
A dialogue about two interdependent plans is beneficial when, at the end of the dialogue, the feasibility
of the plans has increased. This is determined by an increase of the number of conflicts solved between
the plans.
We intend to show the benefits of a more flexible protocol, Pcir, able to share information about new
circumstances, in comparison with a more restrictive protocol Pncir within a deliberation dialogue. As
previously mentioned, the 275 pairs of plans vary in number of conflicts between them due to scheduling
or norm violation. This permits us to study different aspects of robustness of the argumentation system
as the complexity of the problem increases. The complexity is given by the total number of conflicts that
exist between two initial plans (TOT).
The following hypotheses may be used to evaluate the criteria:
Hypothesis 1. The use of a protocol where agents can share additional information about circumstances
Pcir during dialogue is more effective in conveying information, and thus increases the feasibility of the
interdependent plans (Criterion 2).
Hypothesis 2. The use of a protocol where agents can share additional information about circumstances
Pcir leads to an increase in the number of arguments exchanged supporting a more thorough evaluation
of each proposal (Criterion 5).
7.2. Results
In Fig. 7 we report a subset of selected results obtained with similar experiments of [12]. Side A rep-
resents the data and linear regressions of the number of conflicts solved (SOLV), while side B represents
the number of arguments exchanged (ARGS) in both cases, when the total number of conflicts increases
(TOT).2
Figure 7(A) shows the results on the number of conflicts solved when the complexity of the problems
increases providing evidence for Hypothesis 1. The graph shows that the number of conflicts solved is
significantly higher when agents employ Pcir than using Pncir. This is a measure for testing the accuracy
and completeness of the information regarding the circumstances of the case. We showed that many con-
flicts may only be solved through the exchange of information about the circumstances especially when
the complexity of the problem increases. These results also give some information about Criterion 1,
and, in fact, we notice that conflicts that are solved using Pcir are not solved using Pncir. This indicates
that some proposals found in Pcir were probably not considered in Pncir, although further proposal track-
ing would be needed to disambiguate this case from the case in which those proposals were considered
but not chosen as suitable options.
Our second hypothesis is verified in Fig. 7(B). The top line corresponds to the number of arguments
moved in Pcir and the bottom line is Pncir. In a protocol where more information about circumstances is
exchanged, there is more possibility for agents to discuss their proposal and claims more thoroughly. The
2Results are statistically significant at p  0.001 tested with two-way ANOVA.
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Fig. 7. Conflicts solved and arguments as total number of conflicts increases.
results prove the claim that the arguments exchange ARGS in Pcir are significantly higher than with Pncir.
We attribute the increase in the number of conflicts solved showed for Hypothesis 1 to the information
shared within the two protocols, since the experiments were performed on the same pairs of plans.
We have presented here an initial simple method for measuring some of the criteria presented for re-
solving the closure problem: we considered the variation of number of conflicts solved as indicator of
the accuracy and completeness of information exchanged, and the variation of number of arguments as
indicator of the thoroughness of the discussion about a proposal. There is the need, however, to develop
a more standard method for measuring these criteria in order to determine the educational value of delib-
eration in agent-based systems. More investigation within computational system is required to establish
general conditions under which it is possible to measure these criteria, or to determine whether certain
criteria are more useful than others in specific domains. In order to inform this framework, the work
of Amgoud and Dupin De Saint Cyr [1] on measures of argumentation-based persuasion dialogue may
be useful, especially in relation to those measures related to agents borrowing each other’s information,
with adequate revisions to consider the differences that deliberation dialogue presents.
8. Conclusion
We have explored the problem of whether current models for agent deliberation capture the richness of
human deliberative dialogue. Agent deliberation protocols are based on models of natural deliberation.
Black and Atkinson [3], for example, consider agents with different expertise that deliberate over the best
action to perform in collaboration. Agents establish what to believe about the surrounding circumstances,
and then propose and discuss actions that promote or demote societal values. Similarly, in Kok et al. [7]
a team of agents deliberate about the best option to achieve a goal. In the dialogue agents can propose,
withdraw, or challenge options. However, these systems lack of representation of phases that may occur
in natural deliberation.
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In order to address this problem, we discussed the work of McBurney et al. [8], which presents a
model of deliberation underpinning many dialogue systems including [3,7]. We showed that this rep-
resents a good model of how deliberation proceeds in real settings, permitting agents to interweave
phases of information-seeking and argumentation for practical reasoning. An important characteristic
for intelligent rational deliberation is, however, missing: considering changes in circumstances during
the course of the dialogue. We proposed an extension to the MHP dialogue in which agents are open to
the exchange of new knowledge. We showed that our framework [11,12] considers, to a certain extent,
the situation where agents can willingly share information about new circumstances. We demonstrated
that this is necessary to identify more successful outcomes.
New circumstances may initiate an infinite cycle of rethinking and reevaluating proposals. We argued
that some criteria must be established to determine when the practical reasoning can be closed off and
to declare whether the deliberation has been successful. People engaging in natural deliberation may
find dialogue educationally successful even if the debate terminated without an agreement. In the MHP
model, however, agents are required to find an agreement to declare the dialogue successful. How this
can be extended so that agent deliberation better reflects human deliberation is a question to which we
provided some answers. We proposed ten criteria to determine whether the dialogue has been successful;
criteria that we argue should be implemented in agent-based models of deliberation dialogue. Measures
for these criteria must also be defined to permit the evaluation of the educational benefits of the dialogue.
Here, we demonstrated that, thanks to the sharing of information about new circumstances, agents are
able to identify more beneficial agreements.
We proposed two new phases that extend the MHP dialogue to consider dynamic changes of circum-
stances during dialogue and to address the problem of how to determine success. We believe that our
extended model will facilitate the development of applications that are able to represent rich deliberation
processes to support human decision-making in a more effective way.
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